PI Brief Update

Ritchie v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2026] EWCC50 - Lucy Stock, Temple Garden Chambers

26/10/26. In Ritchie v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2026] EWCC50, Grimshaw HHJ considered the issue of whether a settlement by a claimant for personal injuries during their lifetime bars his dependents from bringing a clinical negligence claim against a concurrent tortfeasor after his death.

Background

The Claimant, Angela Ritchie, was the wife of the late Brian Ritchie (“the Deceased”) who underwent a mitral and tricuspid heart valve repair at the Defendant’s hospital on 12 March 2015. During the procedure he is believed to have contracted Mycobacterium Chimaera (“MC”) mitral valve endocarditis from a contaminated heater cooler unit manufactured by a company (“the Company”) and which was used by the Defendant., The Deceased had entered into a settlement with the Company in the sum of £250,000 damages plus £20,000 costs on 16 August 2022, before passing away on 28 October 2022. The Claimant argued that, but for the failures on behalf of the Defendant and its clinicians, which had come to light during a later Inquest, the Deceased would have survived a further two years than he did, and his pain and suffering would have been ameliorated earlier. Proceedings were issued on 13 October 2025 with the claim amounting to damages of £35,214.95.

The issues

There were three central issues before the Court [22]:

1. Did existing legal authorities prevented the Claimant from recovering any losses under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (“FAA”) given the ‘in life’ settlement which had been reached between the Deceased and the Company?
2. Did the Settlement Agreement constituted full satisfaction of the harm caused by the MC infection and linked to that issue, whether the damage sought was the same as the damage compensated in the earlier claim and subsequent settlement?
3. If the Claimant could not recover any damages was it appropriate to dispose of the case summarily and, if so, was the correct approach to strike the claim out or to enter summary judgment?

The Authorities

The relevant authorities relating to s1(1) FAA, concurrent tortfeasors, and the doctrine of full satisfaction were laid out in detail at [23]-[50].

The Court gave particular weight to Thompson v Arnold [2007] EWHC 1875 (QB) in which Langstaff J at [5], citing Read v Great Eastern Railway (1868) LR 3 QB 555, established that “where a claimant pursued to judgment or settlement a claim for damages for an injury which subsequently proved fatal their dependants could have no right of action under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976” [25]. The phrase “full and final settlement” was to be objectively understood as referring to the whole of the lifetime damages claim being settled and did not permit subsequent exploration of certain heads of loss.

The Court then turned to Jameson & Anr v Central Electricity Generating Board [2000] 1 A.C. 455, which was a case related to concurrent tortfeasors. Lord Hope found that a settlement with one tortfeasor cannot extinguish the claimant’s claim against the other concurrent tortfeasor; the relevant question is whether the claim has been satisfied, the answer to which is found by examining the terms of the agreement and comparing it with what has been claimed. The effect of this principle was identified in Heaton and Others v AXA Equity & Law Assurance Society Plc and Others [2002] 2 AC 329 by Lord Bingham who explained that the primary focus of attention should be the construction of the agreement in its appropriate factual context.

Judgment

Issue 1: Grimshaw HHJ considered himself bound by Thompson, Jameson and Heaton: arguments relating to the drafting of the FAA and/ or whether Read or Thompson were wrongly decided were not a matter for him. Grimshaw HHJ outlined the following guiding principles from the binding authorities:

• A settlement against one concurrent tortfeasor does not automatically release another concurrent tortfeasor from liability, but it may do so if the claimant achieves full satisfaction of the tort against the first tortfeasor;
• Full satisfaction is not the same as full value; and
• The Court must consider a Settlement Agreement against the relevant factual matrix, but not embark upon a detailed inquiry that seeks to value what the Court would have awarded for the Deceased’s (and potentially the Claimant’s) claim.
• A claimant cannot pursue a claim under the FAA if they have settled their claim for the same damage which would form the basis of the claim under the FAA.

Issue 2: Grimshaw HHJ found that the Settlement Agreement did constitute full satisfaction of the harm caused due to MC infection, for the following reasons: 

• The claim advanced against the Company was for all of the losses that could be recovered by way of an ‘in life’ claim, including a claim for lost years.
• There was a lost years claim advanced in the May 2022 Schedule prior to the Settlement Agreement indicting that it was intended to cover such a reduction in life expectancy.
• The Settlement Agreement clearly excluded any further claim under the FAA or the LRMPA.
• Even had the case gone to trial, it was “vanishingly unlikely” [68, iv] that a Court would have awarded the full value of a pleaded schedule of loss. Although the Settlement Agreement was for a figure lower than initially claimed this did not mean it was not full satisfaction.

The Deceased had obtained full satisfaction for the tort within his lifetime and therefore would not have been able to maintain an action against the Defendant during his lifetime: s.1(1) of the FAA was therefore not open to the Claimant.

Issue 3: Grimshaw HHJ held that there was no reasonable prospect of the Claimant succeeding on the claim and no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial. He found that the Claimant’s statement of case of case did disclose a cause of action recognised in law and a reasonable ground for bringing the claim; therefore, summary judgment was more appropriate than striking out the claim.

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