PI Brief Update

Commitment Issues: The Court of Appeal Separates Committal from Contempt - Georgina Pressdee, Temple Garden Chambers

21/12/25. On 11 November 2025, the Court of Appeal handed down its Judgment in Buzzard-Quashie v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police [2025] EWCA Civ 1397 which reiterates and reaffirms several key principles in the law of civil contempt.

Background

The Appellant (A) had been arrested and taken into custody but the charges against her were quickly dropped. She alleged that she was assaulted by the arresting officers and complained about this via telephone shortly after the arrest. She requested all the footage recorded on the officer’s body worn cameras (BWV) and asked for it to be preserved. When the police refused, A obtained an order from the ICO that it be produced. Following this she brought proceedings for breach of statutory duty under the Data Protection Act 2018 and obtained a Judgment for its production, together with an explanation for any footage that was no longer available. When neither part was complied with, A applied to commit Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police (R) for contempt.

A's application failed on the facts because a witness statement was lodged on R’s behalf expressly stating that all BWV in existence had been produced. HHJ Genn held that it must also fail as a matter of law, because (1) there was no intention to interfere with the administration of justice, (2) R was not personally responsible for acts performed by members of his police force, and (3) there was no penal notice on the order.

A was granted permission to appeal. The footage, whose existence had been denied, was finally discovered a few days before the hearing. R conceded the appeal, but the Court of Appeal nevertheless considered the matter, as it raised important legal points of wider application. A’s grounds of appeal included a challenge to all three of HHJ Genn’s conclusions on law (referred to below as Grounds 1 to 3).

Ruling

Ground 1

The Court of Appeal considered the authorities (notably Caudrilla Bowman Ltd v Persons Unknown [2020] EWCA Civ 9 and ADM International SARL v Grain House International SA [2024] EWCA Civ 33) and affirmed that specific intention to commit a contempt is relevant to the sanction but not required to make a finding of contempt. The relevant intention is simply to do the act or omission that constituted a breach of the order, objectively construed. 

Ground 2

The Court of Appeal considered R’s legal personality under The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, as a corporation sole (Schedule 2, para 2) and that the police force and its civilian staff are under R’s direction and control (Section 2(3)). This led to the conclusion that there is no distinction between R himself and those under his direction and control. The Court reiterated the comments of Lord Woolf in M v Home Office [1994] UKHL 5; [1994] 1 AC 377 that, “the object of the exercise is not so much to punish an individual as to vindicate the rule of law by a finding of contempt. This can be achieved equally by a declaratory finding of the court as to the contempt”.

Ground 3

The Court of Appeal considered that creating two different tiers of Court order – those with a penal notice and those without – could make compliance with the latter “nice but not essential”. The requirement in CPR r81.9(1) that there be a penal notice relates only to enforcement (by committal), not to findings of contempt at all (CPR r81.4). The existence of a penal notice is relevant only to the appropriate sanction.

Comment

This Judgment largely rehearses and restates existing principles in the law of civil contempt. The key take home for practitioners is the need to separate the two stages of a finding of contempt: (1) the finding itself and (2) the appropriate sanction. The wilfulness of the breach, personal involvement of the respondent and existence of a penal notice all speak to the second stage but not to the first.

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