PI Brief Update

Mazur overturned in the Court of Appeal - Michael Brooks Reid, Temple Garden Chambers

27/04/26. It is no exaggeration to say that the decision of Sheldon J inMazur v Charles Russell Speechlys[2025] EWHC 2341 (KB) sent shockwaves throughout the legal profession.

Fellow personal injury practitioners will have seen first-hand solicitors’ responses over the past months, often in the form of annexes to briefs outlining the firm’s strategic approach to Mazur and how to respond if Mazur is raised by an opponent. Many seemed to take the Ming Vase strategy, in almost an unspoken ceasefire agreement whilst awaiting the Court of Appeal’s decision.

In March, in Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP[2026] EWCA Civ 369, the Court of Appeal including the Master of the Rolls and the Chancellor of the High Court, overturned Sheldon J’s decision and allowed the appeal.

Background

The tradition of unqualified staff (such as managing clerks, paralegals, caseworkers and trainee solicitors), performing tasks which form part of the “conduct of litigation” dates back to Victorian times. Such tasks include, for example, preparing and issuing claims, conducting correspondence on behalf of clients, gathering evidence, instructing counsel and signing statements of truth.

The Legal Services Act 2007 (“LSA”) made "the conduct of litigation" a reserved legal activity and created a criminal offence for carrying on a reserved legal activity without entitlement.

The key issue in Mazurconcerned the proper meaning of the words “carry on the conduct of litigation” as used in the LSA, and ultimately, whether an unauthorised person performing tasks forming part of the conduct of litigation under the supervision of an authorised individual, is committing an offence. Given how widespread such practice is, the Ming Vase strategy was hardly surprising.

High Court decision

The Law Society and the Solicitors Regulation Authority respondents had submitted that the LSA drew a clear distinction between (a) an unauthorised personsupporting or assistingan authorised solicitor in the conduct of litigation, and (b) an unauthorised personconducting litigationunder the supervisionof an authorised solicitor. Sheldon J accepted the submission that (a) is lawful whereas (b) is not. In his judgment, unqualified staff had an important supporting role, but their work must not cross the boundary into conducting litigation itself, which could only be done by an authorised person.

Court of Appeal

Sir Colin Birss, Chancellor of the High Court (with whom the Master of the Rolls and Lady Justice Andrews agreed), allowed the appeal and overturned Sheldon J's decision.

The Court traced the practice of delegation from the Victorian era through to the present day, noting consistent judicial recognition that solicitors could and routinely did delegate tasks within the conduct of litigation to unqualified clerks, while retaining professional responsibility for them. Parliament, in enacting the LSA, must be taken to have understood this widespread and regulated practice, and there was nothing in the Act's words or preparatory materials to suggest an intention to criminalise it.

The Court held that the words "conduct of litigation" refer to the tasks to be undertaken, while the words "carry on" refer to thedirection, control and responsibilityfor those tasks. As such, where an authorised individual properly delegates tasks to an unauthorised person and retains responsibility, it is the authorised individual who carries on the conduct of litigation, not the unauthorised person. Sheldon J was wrong to distinguish between (a) and (b) above.

The degree of supervision required will vary depending on the circumstances. Routine, lower-risk tasks may require no more than regular meetings and sampling of work, whereas more complex or higher-risk matters will demand closer involvement. The precise details of supervision are a matter for the regulators.

Comment

The Court of Appeal’s decision will come as a relief to many within the legal sector. The High Court decision had the potential to criminalise the everyday working practices of solicitors’ firms across the country. In a thinly veiled criticism of those appearing before Sheldon J, the Chancellor felt that the judge “…did not receive as much help as could have been expected”. It may take some time before they sleep soundly at night.

In a short concurring judgment, Andrews LJ held that the key question is whether an individual is, in reality, carrying out tasks on behalf of an authorised individual (and under their supervision), or is rather, in truth, simply conducting litigation on their own. Whilst this is a question of fact and degree, solicitors must ensure that their models remain on the right side of the line.

It is not yet known whether an application will be made for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court, but the part of the permission test requiring a point of law of general public importance is likely to be satisfied.

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