A hollow victory: Harassment proven but dishonest Claimant loses all - Michael Brooks Reid, Temple Garden Chambers

20/12/25. Michael Brooks Reid discusses the recent High Court decision in Taiwo v Homelets of Bath Ltd [2025] EWHC 3173 (KB), in which the whole claim, including statutory damages for harassment, was dismissed following a finding of fundamental dishonesty.
Facts
The Claimant brought proceedings arising out of her treatment by the Defendant landlord and its agents during an attempted eviction in 2010. At a liability only trial in 2018, it was found that the Claimant had been subjected to harassment contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and had been assaulted.
At the quantum trial, the Claimant, acting through a Litigation Friend, advanced a claim of around £2 million before HHJ Blohm KC (“the trial judge”), founded on alleged long-term psychiatric injury, loss of earnings and injury to feelings (“Vento” damages).
The Defendant sought dismissal of the claim under section 57 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 (“section 57”), contending that the Claimant had been fundamentally dishonest (“FD”). The trial judge agreed, finding fundamental dishonesty in relation to several aspects of the Claimant’s case: her marriage was found to be a sham, she had made dishonest benefit claims and had, over a sustained period, exaggerated her psychiatric symptoms. The trial judge terminated the Claimant’s litigant friend, finding that the Claimant did not lack capacity, and dismissed the whole claim under section 57 (“the dismissal”).
The Claimant sought permission to appeal.
Issues
Before the Constable J in the High Court (“the Judge”), the Claimant sought permission to appeal the dismissal on various grounds. The judgment dealt with three issues which may be of interest to practitioners:
- The extent to which fundamental dishonesty must be pleaded and put;
- The extent to which a court may draw inferences of dishonesty from the evidence, including evidential gaps; and
- Whether Vento damages fall within the scope of section 57 dismissal.
There was a large section of the judgment devoted to the procedural history of the claim which included at least 30 applications by, or on behalf of, the Claimant. One of the questions later addressed by the Judge was whether to issue a civil restraint (“CRO”).
The Decision
(1) Must FD be pleaded?
The Judge rejected the argument that a section 57 finding was impermissible because FD had not been pleaded nor fairly put to the Claimant in cross examination. As per Howlett v Davies [2017] EWCA Civ 1696, a defendant is not required to plead FD in terms, provided that the claimant has sufficient notice of the dishonesty case to be met by the time of trial. That is a question of “substance, not form”.
In the present case, the genuineness of the Claimant’s marriage, the authenticity of her benefit claims, and the veracity of her reported psychiatric symptoms were all clearly in issue on the pleadings and explored in evidence. The Claimant could therefore not credibly suggest ambush.
(2) Inference and evidential gaps
It was argued that the trial judge had reversed the burden of proof, requiring the Claimant to prove honesty. It was said the trial judge had relied on speculation, inference, and missing evidence.
This ground was roundly rejected by Constable J. Whilst the burden of proving dishonesty lays with the Defendant, that does not prevent a court from drawing reasonable inferences from the totality of the evidence, including from evidential gaps which one would expect to be filled if the claimant’s account were genuine.
For example, the trial judge had identified a series of evidential lacunae – the absence of ordinary indications of a genuine marital relationship – which, taken together with the positive evidence, entitled him to conclude that the marriage was not genuine. That did not amount to reversing the burden of proof but was a conventional evaluative exercise.
The Judge noted that section 57 cases frequently depend on inference. Provided the judge applies the correct legal test and gives cogent reasons, appellate interference will be rare.
(3) Do Vento damages fall to be dismissed under section 57?
The Claimant further argued that damages for injury to feelings under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 should survive section 57 dismissal.
That argument was also rejected. An award of damages under the 1997 Act is a “statutory claim for anxiety caused by harassment”. That is a claim for personal injury and part of the “primary claim” for the purpose of section 57.
Accordingly, once fundamental dishonesty was established, Vento damages also fell to be dismissed (absent substantial injustice).
(4) Other matters
The judgment dealt with various other matters falling outside the scope of this article. However, interestingly (and topically), the Judge addressed the citation of a false authority (likely AI generated) in the Claimant’s skeleton argument at an earlier hearing. He considered that false authorities are just as unsatisfactory when presented by a litigant in person than if by a legal professional, albeit the consequences may not be as severe. The Judge was clearly unimpressed with the Claimant and her then litigation friend’s conduct throughout and decided to make a Limited CRO against both.
Comment
Taiwo, although only a decision on permission to appeal, is an interesting application of the principles of FD against an overzealous litigant in person. The question of whether Vento damages are immune from section 57 dismissal was a novel point which the Judge resolved by analogy with the Limitation Act 1980. It is a reminder that an FD finding is an evaluative finding of fact by the trial judge and there is a very high bar to overturning it on appeal.
Image ©iStockphoto.com/OJO Images








